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This paper reviews the recent argument that fo-
rensics is epistemic, suggesting that those who adopt 
that metaphor could serve themselves better by ap-
proaching impromptu speaking as an epistemic ex-
ercise. It draws upon Pat Gehrke's critique of debate 
pedagogy to form a framework to analyze impromp-
tu as it is currently performed—and its obsession 
with starting from the truth, espousing all views with 
certainty, and adhering to a linear model of analysis. 
Finally, it offers several options for those impromp-
tuers wishing to break the mold, arguing that the so-
called "mistakes" made by beginning impromptuers 
could, with practice, lead to more insightful speeches 
than the current style of competition. 
 
Introduction 
James Geary (2005), author of two books about 
aphorisms (or what we call “impromptu quota-
tions”), calls them “particle accelerators for the 
mind.” He explains his fascination for the earliest, 
and shortest, literary form: 
 
They make you question everything you do. 
Aphorisms are spurs to action. It‟s not enough to 
just read one and mutter sagely to yourself, „How 
true, how true.‟ Aphorisms make you want to do 
something; admiring them without putting them 
into practice is like learning to read music but 
neglecting to play an instrument. (p. 8) 
 
A full-career impromptu speaker will put hun-
dreds of these assertions into practice. The current 
expectation in the event requires that the student 
select a single interpretation of each quotation, then 
argue for or against its accuracy. While teaching an 
introductory impromptu speaker this method eases 
the difficulty for instructors, more experienced com-
petitors may encounter a malaise toward the event. 
Some consider the structure too limiting; it provides 
little wiggle room for considering multiple ways a 
quotation can be construed. Similarly, the constant 
arguing of linear perspectives may eventually feel 
like oversimplification. More than a few impromptu 
speakers have confessed to me that they felt like a 
“motivational speaker” by the end of their career. I 
target this paper toward those experiencing this im-
promptu malaise, and recommend new approaches 
to prevent intelligent minds from feeling constricted. 
Maximizing the effectiveness of impromptu as a 
learning exercise will require competitors to aspire 
toward an epistemic perspective. 
 Robert Littlefield (2006) recently broke 
from the ranks of those debating the educational or 
competitive nature of forensics. Instead, he claimed 
that forensics, like rhetoric, is epistemic. Forensics 
provides experiential knowledge, forcing students to 
adapt to the complexities of each unique environ-
ment, from the preferences of individual judges to 
fellow competitors' interpretation of events. Just as 
in the real world, the most honest and hard-working 
individual may fail. What Littlefield provides is a 
personal philosophy for forensics, one which may 
not only help the community better understand the 
activity, but also help fledgling programs justify their 
existence: 
 
In the end, I must be content with an imperfect, 
relativistic world where not all is good, not all are 
fair, not all are ethical, and not all practices are 
justifiable. The only way I can justify forensics is 
with the understanding that experience is know-
ledge; forensics is epistemic. (p. 13) 
 
I believe that Littlefield's insights deserve to be 
taken seriously, if only as a coping mechanism for 
students who put forth great effort for little reward. 
But for those of us who adopt an epistemic metaphor 
for forensics, it would serve us well to evaluate the 
events as we teach them and consider how to better 
harness the metaphor. The experience of forensics is 
epistemic. But are our events epistemic? 
Pat Gehrke (1998) reviews the theory of rhetoric 
as epistemic, as advanced by Robert Scott: The belief 
that truth stems from human interaction. Gehrke 
argues that we should not approach arguments as 
though we possess correct answers. Likewise, he 
does not believe we should regard those we debate 
against as “opponents,” but rather as possessors of 
unique perspectives and ideas to be “constructively 
engaged” (p. 9). He confronts current argumentation 
pedagogy, highlighting four ways in which textbooks 
and professors have failed to connect theories of ep-
istemic rhetoric to actual teaching: 
 
First, argumentation texts favor a particular log-
ical model of reasoning: a Western linear mode 
of logic. Second, there is an implicit assumption 
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of the need to know the truth before engaging in 
argument. Third, these texts approach argumen-
tation and debate from an oppositional model. 
Fourth, and perhaps most disturbing, the critical 
tools of argumentation are depicted as ways to 
assess others' reasoning and rarely one's own. 
(p. 5) 
 
In this paper, I apply these criticisms of debate 
pedagogy to the practice of impromptu speaking at 
American Forensics Association and National Foren-
sics Association tournaments. I select impromptu 
because it has inexplicit rules and guidelines. It is 
the one event where students are literally provided 
seven minutes to grapple with a quotation however 
they choose. The expectation that every speech push 
a single persuasive argument is, therefore, an entire-
ly “unwritten rule” that students have every right to 
break. (This differs from persuasion, where, as the 
name implies, the student should persuade.) Fur-
ther, because impromptu is a limited preparation 
event, students who concur with my sentiments can 
nimbly react and experiment without sacrificing the 
time required to write and memorize scripts. For this 
reason, I believe that if forensics competitors truly 
seek to dismantle the rigidity of their activity, im-
promptu could be the most reasonable place to be-
gin. My goal is to place forensicators on the road to-
ward an impromptu ripe with experimentation and 
aligned with the epistemic perspective that many 
communication scholars have embraced. 
 
Difficulties with Impromptu 
Truly epistemic argumentation recognizes a di-
verse array of argumentative styles, including femin-
ist, non-Western, and narrative-based models. As 
Gehrke attests, most argumentation textbooks fail to 
address these theoretical shifts. Instead, he states, 
they “generally rely upon syllogisms, the Toulmin 
model, or fallacies of informal logic” (p. 6). Similarly, 
impromptu speaking utilizes a simplified version of 
Stephen Toulmin‟s logical model. The Toulmin mod-
el stresses the "movement" from observable data, 
through warrants for a position, to a claim (Benoit, 
Hample, & Benoit, 1992, p. 227).  
"Unified analysis," the structure utilized by the 
vast majority of impromptu speakers, hinges on 
movement from the data given (the quotation) to a 
claim (the speaker's thesis statement). The speaker 
then provides two warrants, or "reasons" for their 
claim. True to the Toulmin model, the speaker illu-
minates backing for his argument, in the form of 
theories or anecdotal examples. Impromptuers are 
expected by judging paradigms to repeat every major 
argumentative warrant, or "tag," multiple times in 
the speech. This technique is called "signposting," 
and ensures that the speech answers a question cen-
tral to Toulmin's model: "How [did] you get there?" 
(Benoit, Hample, & Benoit, p. 227) This allows 
judges to transcribe the speech easily, diagramming 
the speaker's utterances in a linear outline. Even 
less-used “three-point” structures, though mold-
breaking, still emphasize signposts and a linear 
structure centering on a thesis statement. Impromp-
tu, therefore, suffers from the same linearity Gehrke 
observed in argumentation classrooms—and limits 
speakers‟ rhetoric more than a fully observed Toul-
min model. 
Gehrke‟s second contention with argumentation 
pedagogy is its assumption that one must start from 
the truth, and argue accordingly (p. 7). Like debate, 
impromptu has fallen into the truth-adherence rut. 
Impromptu speakers are taught to always agree or 
disagree with their quotation. Their thesis statement 
is then built on this choice, and the speaker argues 
accordingly. 
The notion that a student must “pick a side” is 
troubling because seldom will the student actually 
“know” what he is arguing. When a student develops 
his interpretation of the quotation, the reasoning 
used is what theorist Charles Peirce (1998) called 
“abduction.” The process is as follows: 
 
“The surprising fact, C, is observed. 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of 
course. 
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true 
(p. 231)” 
 
It is, literally, the process of forming a hypothe-
sis. In the case of impromptu, C is the quotation, 
which is always a surprise, and A is the immediate 
stab at its meaning. As Peirce suggests, “The abduc-
tive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of 
insight.” But, Peirce warns, the abduction is an “ex-
tremely fallible insight (p. 227).”  
Abduction is untested and unreasoned. It is, 
quite simply, an immediate hypothesis. When an 
impromptu speaker develops a “thesis,” what he has 
truly developed is a hypothesis: An abductive, poten-
tial explanation. Yet, competitors are encouraged to 
speak with an air of certainty, jettisoning all doubt. 
In other words: Not only does impromptu force stu-
dents to start from a truth; it forces students to ar-
gue on behalf of an untested truth. 
Third, Gehrke criticizes the oppositional nature 
of argumentation pedagogy. He refers to numerous 
other scholars who refute the mindset that a debate 
takes place between two rival positions, where only 
one can be correct (p. 9, 10). Epistemic perspectives 
do not embrace such absolutism, because beliefs rely 
on individual experience. A student respecting the 
multiplicity of possible beliefs on a subject should be 
commended as insightful. As Toulmin (1992) ex-
plained in his book Cosmopolis: “Tolerating… plural-
ity, ambiguity, or lack of certainty is no error, let 
alone a sin. Honest reflection shows that it is part of 
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the price we inevitably pay for being human beings, 
and not gods.” (p. 30). 
The notion that other sides should be attacked, 
rather than thoughtfully contemplated, has also been 
adopted in impromptu. Before speaking, impromp-
tuers do not witness each other‟s speeches, which 
prevents direct refutation. However, students still 
refuse to consider any viewpoint beyond the solitary, 
linear argument they construct. Consider a student, 
in an impromptu round at a national tournament, 
using one of the following claims: 
 
1) “While most of the time, X perspective is true, I 
will argue that we should be mindful of Y pers-
pective.” 
2) “In my personal experience, Y perspective is cor-
rect.” 
3) “While my first instinct was to argue Y perspec-
tive, I hit a snag and realized X perspective must 
be correct.” 
 
In the first example, judges would chastise the 
student for conceding that other arguments are more 
often true than their own. In the second, one could 
expect a judge to trivialize the student‟s use of per-
sonal experience as evidence; impromptuers are ex-
pected to speak in universals. In the third instance, 
the competitor has conceded that their first hypothe-
sis failed, and that they had to restart with a differ-
ent one. As a student groping for truth, this speaker 
has the potential to grapple with the multifaceted 
nature of the quotation. However, the student has 
acknowledged an alternative viewpoint, and will 
likely suffer as a result.  
When students feign omnipotence in their ar-
guments, they reject the linear Western model to 
which the competitive framework otherwise adheres. 
In order to differentiate his model from classical log-
ic, Toulmin included qualifiers that specify degrees 
of certainty. He also implemented rebuttal state-
ments, which offer possible circumstances in which a 
claim could fall through (Benoit, Hample, & Benoit, 
p. 232). In suggesting these as possibilities in struc-
tured (or unstructured) argumentation, Toulmin 
reinforced the view that faux-confidence need not 
infiltrate debates. However, these statements are not 
tolerated in impromptu rounds. Instead, forensics 
educators teach students that any argument sup-
ported by three or four interesting examples can be 
advocated with complete certainty. 
Finally, Gehrke fears that the three previous 
concerns leave students in argumentation class-
rooms without the capacity for self-reflection. He 
finds that textbooks focus on deconstructing what 
others say, rather than one‟s own arguments. Stu-
dents, rather than examining their own identity, in-
stead are taught to combat the “influences” of others 
(p. 11). Gehrke stresses the risk this creates: “Focus-
ing argumentation and critical thought away from 
the self impedes the consideration of how arguments 
represent and construct the self” (p. 12).  
Impromptu provides students with a remarkable 
opportunity to identify their own beliefs. Many com-
petitors spend their entire college careers examining 
assertion after assertion, contemplating what each 
means to them. They call upon their knowledge base 
to determine how they will respond to the quotation. 
Then, they spend as long as six minutes considering 
the subject, actively, in front of an audience of other 
critical thinkers. After four years of this, students 
should walk away with not only the capacity for pro-
ducing eloquent sophisms, but also the humility to 
recognize how many different ways a simple pithy 
statement can be understood. Impromptu, in other 
words, could be a powerful tool in identity construc-
tion. 
Obviously, teaching students to say everything 
with complete confidence, and quickly, has practical 
benefits. Williams, Carver, and Hart (1993) stressed 
impromptu's ability to help students “move intelli-
gently from the classroom to society,” providing 
them with the sort of “practical experience” they will 
need in job interviews (p. 29, 30). But Gehrke con-
tends that argumentation instructors should resist 
the urge for this business-minded pragmatism: 
 
As teachers of argumentation we need to be 
careful to avoid the temptation to "sell" our dis-
cipline as a "product" that will enhance organi-
zational "output" or personal career "perfor-
mance." These industry terms subvert the exis-
tential motivation to self-critique and return ar-
gumentation to the role of a tool for domination 
or suppression of others. (p. 39) 
 
As impromptu instructors, we have the fortune 
of teaching students willing to place their hearts and 
minds on the line in front of an audience. We should 
seize this opportunity to create generations of critical 
thinkers who do not succumb to the buzz-word men-
tality that simplifies all ideas into easily transcribed 
“tags.” It is time to move toward an impromptu that 
is open-minded, situational, and tailored to each 
individual competitor‟s experience.  
 
A Toolbox for an Epistemic Impromptu 
 I have identified how impromptu is restric-
tive and fails to meet its full potential as an inspira-
tion for self-critique. What I provide is not a rigid 
alternative structure, because, like Gerhke, I believe 
that a prescriptive antidote “would betray the very 
goal of this project” (p. 32). Instead, I advocate sev-
eral possible alternatives and encourage competitors 
to develop and construct their own. Many of these 
propositions refine the so-called “mistakes” speakers 
make when they begin their careers. Here I suggest 
that a speaker who actually practices and develops 
what we currently regard as off-limits could even-
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tually deliver deeply insightful and inspiring speech-
es. 
 
Embrace a Narrative Structure 
Impromptu speaking already relies upon anec-
dotal evidence; most speeches are driven predomi-
nantly by stories. As such, converting to a narrative-
driven structure would not be a challenging stretch 
for most students. Rather than adhering to a rigid, 
signposted format of data, warrants, and a claim, 
this would be based instead upon the format that 
drives many of the most famous speeches in history. 
R. H. Stephenson (1980), in his search for an ideal 
method for analyzing quotations, drew upon a type 
of rhetoric typically ignored by forensics as an activi-
ty: Epideictic. As he explains, "this form of oratory... 
was assimilated by the ancients to the genre of lite-
rary prose and the literary statement of general 
truths" (p. 13). Because the aphorisms students ana-
lyze lack specific content, the student cycles through 
a series of stories that illuminate the multiple issues 
it raises.  
Gerard Hauser (1999), in his examination of ep-
ideictic in Athens, suggested that the teacher-
persuader in this type of speech "presents the story 
of individuals and deeds worth imitating," interpret-
ing values to the audience along the way (p. 17). The 
epideictic impromptu speaker would work from one 
narrative episode to the next. The challenge would 
lie in creating smooth and eloquent transitions be-
tween each story, such that the audience witnesses 
the speech as a concrete whole rather than a choppy 
series of assertions. 
 
Don’t reveal the Destination 
Gehrke notes that many Chinese speakers who 
develop English as a second language do not state 
their argumentative thesis until the end of an oration 
(p. 24). Impromptu competitors should not be criti-
cized for opting to save their central theme until 
their conclusion, as this would allow for a speech 
that builds to a point of culmination—rather than a 
speech that continually tries to justify itself. 
Alternately, students could be encouraged to 
create a speech that refutes itself—a speech that, in 
the spirit of epistemic rhetoric, considers multiple 
sides before settling on a position. Adopting this 
style would better reflect the way people actually 
communicate; as Gehrke notes, traditional Western 
structures “can never completely account for the log-
ics of discourse, the multiplicity of ways involved in 
the arguments of the everyday” (p. 23). He suggests 
that students in debate switch sides mid-argument 
to understand the fallibility of each perspective. Im-
promptuers, who are not tethered to a single posi-
tion, could go a step further than their forensic peers 
in debate. Epistemic speakers would weigh several 
perspectives on a quotation before settling on one—
or better yet, settling on none. The self-refuting im-
promptuer could become a manifestation of multifa-
ceted argument. For a speaker to state one case and 
in the same breath state another does not merit con-
demnation. If considered thoughtfully, it could show 
that the student appreciates our world‟s uncertain 
and untidy nature. By adopting these strategies, stu-
dents could abandon the imaginary certainty that 
currently leaves a “motivational speaker” aftertaste. 
 
Consider the Type of Quotation 
Marjorie Garber‟s (1999) assessment of how 
writers utilize quotations noted that, “Quotations are 
inserted into a borrower-text as precisely what their 
authors did not claim: a ground of fact” (p. 666). 
Similarly, impromptu speeches almost universally 
regard the quotation as a truth-statement; a great 
deal of emphasis is placed on interpretation, or what 
the point the author “intended to make.” This fails to 
recognize that not all quotations are meant to be 
taken as statements of truth. By considering the dif-
ferent styles quotations can adopt, speakers can 
adapt their speeches to reflect each situation. 
Literary theorist Gary Saul Morson (2003) has 
created a schema for analyzing quotations, noting 
that they tend to adopt one of two major forms: The 
dictum and the aphorism. Dicta, he notes, are state-
ments that attempt to close off a philosophical de-
bate; they are declarations that “aspire to absolute 
clarity” (p. 417). Aphorisms, on the other hand, are 
not meant to be taken as something to be agreed or 
disagreed with. They are open-ended philosophical 
statements, designed to provoke deeper thought on 
an issue (p. 421).  
Fellow theorist Kevin Morell (2006) noted 
another scale by which aphorisms can be critiqued: 
Creative versus destructive. Creative aphorisms have 
an optimistic nature and encourage constructive 
thinking; destructive aphorisms aim to shut down a 
line of thought (p. 373). Grappling with these ques-
tions of form before diving into analysis could pro-
vide students with new angles and perspectives for 
considering the quotation. 
Likewise, a specific consideration could be made 
for proverbs: What Geary calls an aphorism without 
identity (p. 14). Impromptuers frequently receive 
proverbs, which are so socially pervasive that stu-
dents can likely remember hearing them before the 
round. In this situation, the student could engage in 
an actual rhetorical criticism: They could question 
why, exactly, this statement has become so popular 
(or so cliché), and whether that reflects positively or 
negatively. 
Finally, students can, when it applies, recognize 
an author‟s context. Certainly, “Absolute power cor-
rupts absolutely” can receive the standard treatment 
of interpretation, agreement, and application. But a 
competitor who acknowledges the time period or 
experiences of Lord Acton can provide background 
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and perspective on why he made this utterance, un-
earthing ironies and inaccuracies in the process. 
  
Ask, “What Does This Quotation Mean to 
Me?” 
 One of the worst taboos in impromptu 
speaking is the personal example: the explanation of 
how a friend, family member, or speaker dealt with 
the situation in the quotation. I suggest that forensi-
cators reevaluate the absolute rejection of a personal 
dynamic in the event. In other events, such as After-
Dinner Speaking, competitors often receive acco-
lades for delivering speeches that relate to their per-
sonal life or plight. In impromptu, permitting stu-
dents to express what the quotation, or their analy-
sis, means to them would help to eliminate any dis-
connect between speakers and their speeches.  
People have unique and personal reasons for 
their beliefs. Near the end of a speech, a disclosure of 
biases or personal experiences would shed light on 
why the student argued the way he or she did. Not 
only would this disclosure give the audience insight 
into that student‟s social reality; it would aid the 
student in discovering an identity. Perhaps the stu-
dent could concede that certain arguments were has-
ty and not in line with more deeply considered be-
liefs—helping students, with practice, to link their 
speeches more closely to their actual worldview. 
 
Build Your Own Structure 
I concede that many of the aforementioned ideas 
will fall into some type of framework. Some sem-
blance of signposting will be necessary, alongside 
theoretical and anecdotal examples to ensure that 
judges do not perceive students as merely rambling. 
Likewise, the event‟s limited preparation time vir-
tually forces students to have a mental plan for guid-
ing the process of invention. But structures need not 
be cookie-cutter. Forensics educators can present a 
smorgasbord of argumentative styles and help stu-
dents create “Frankenstructures” of their own. 
Every student sees the world differently; every 
student brings a different outlook to the table and 
has the potential to create a structure that reflects 
his or her unique perspective. While some will con-
tend that unified analysis and similar structures 
should remain the universal standard, the belief that 
they serve each student equally is unfair. Many stu-
dents are too contained by the structure, or do not 
think in Western chains of logic. To hold those stu-
dents to unwritten rules is irresponsible. Similarly, 
arguing that educators should adhere to these struc-
tures simply because they are easier to teach unde-
restimates students‟ abilities, particularly those who 
have already developed the skills unified analysis has 
to offer. As educators and judges we must help stu-
dents invent the structures that suit them the best, 
and never condemn them for attempting something 
out of the ordinary. Breaking speech paradigms re-
quires extraordinary courage for students. Those 
who experiment deserve open-minded ballots so 
they are not dissuaded from future attempts. 
A caveat: Even upon hearing suggestions for al-
ternative structures, many students will still feel that 
unified analysis remains their best fit. I do not in-
tend to condemn students who, upon reflection, 
make that decision. However, I still contend that 
within that structure‟s confines, students should 
strive to acknowledge opposing ideas and express 
genuine uncertainty—because any hypothesis gener-
ated in a minute has not received the reflection re-
quired to justify forthright conviction. 
 
Throwing Away the Ladder 
In his first major work, The Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein 
(2003) commented on his aphoristic methodology: 
  
My propositions serve as elucidations in the fol-
lowing way: anyone who understands me recog-
nizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He 
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he 
has climbed up it.) (TLP 6.54) 
 
Impromptu speaking can serve a similar role: 
Every quotation a speaker receives can act as a rung 
on a ladder toward greater understanding. Students 
can grasp how much knowledge depends upon cir-
cumstances and how each individual‟s story influ-
ences what he believes to be true. Just as how Little-
field argued forensics can be justified on the “philo-
sophical level” (p. 1), so too can impromptu.  
As entrants in one of the largest events in foren-
sics, an event that is in no way immunized against 
judging subjectivity and poorly chosen quotations, 
impromptu speakers with a strictly competitive 
perspective have set themselves up for disappoint-
ment. Speakers who view their event as a philosoph-
ical journey will instead perceive their successes and 
failures as a bittersweet aspect of the conversation 
they chose to join. Our duty, as educators, is to let 
these experimenters thrive.  
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